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Abstract: What is the basis of the performance of Islamic equity funds (IEFs)? Is it market 
movements, asset allocation policy, or active portfolio management? Our study is the first to 
address this question in the context of Islamic funds. We use a database consisting of 281 IEFs 
for the period 2007-2016, and we test the role of each factor in explaining their returns. We find 
that market movements dominate the other components, explaining nearly 50% of the monthly 
return variability, and that asset allocation policy and active management together explain the 
other half of IEF returns.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 Islamic funds have been developed in order to satisfy the desire of a portion of investors 
to allocate their capital in accordance with their religious beliefs. Because charging an interest 
rate (riba) is prohibited in Islam and investment in stocks does not imply the receipt of interest, 
managers of Islamic funds invest mainly in firm equity, i.e., stocks.1 These stocks must comply 
with Islamic law, i.e., they cannot be involved in certain industries (e.g., alcohol, tobacco, 
gambling, pork production) and must meet several financial criteria (Aloui et al., 2016). Among 
these financial criteria, the level of debt, cash and interest-bearing funds, and receivables may 
not exceed certain thresholds (Peillex and Ureche-Rangau, 2013). In addition, several financial 
transactions—such as short selling, margin trading, and, more generally, excessive speculation 
(qimar or maysir)—are also prohibited. The sharia compliance of the investment fund’s activity 
is certified by a sharia board.  
The goal of our study is to analyze the basis of the performance of Islamic equity funds 
(IEFs). Is it market movements, asset allocation policy (the choice of the Islamic benchmark of 
the IEF), or active portfolio management (active bets around this Islamic benchmark)? This is 
an important issue for several reasons. 
 First, the rapid and the large expansion of Islamic mutual funds in the past decade argues 
for more research on this financial industry. According to the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(2016), the Islamic mutual fund industry grew from USD28.2 billion in 2004 to USD66.4 
billion at the end of 2016 in terms of assets under management. Moreover, the number of 
Islamic mutual funds also grew, from 285 funds in 2004 to 1,042 funds in 2016.  
                                                          
1 According to the Islamic Financial Services Board (2016), sharia-compliant stocks constitute 36% of the assets 
of Islamic funds, money market instruments 35%, commodities 10%, sukuk 7%, and real estate 6%, and mixed 
allocations account for only 5%. 
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Second, decomposing Islamic fund performance into the three traditional sources of 
performance (market movements, asset allocation policy, and active portfolio management) 
allows us to extend our financial knowledge in this field, which remains limited. Indeed, the 
previous studies on Islamic funds have mainly investigated their comparative financial 
performance without understanding the source of the variability in their financial performance. 
Among these empirical studies, Hayat and Kraeussl (2011) find that IEFs underperform both 
their Islamic and conventional equity benchmarks. In the same vein, while Nainggolan et al. 
(2016) show that IEFs underperform conventional funds by an average of 40 basis points per 
month, Abdelsalam et al. (2014) find that IEFs also underperform their socially responsible 
counterparts. Hence, the literature concludes that when they invest in IEFs Islamic investors 
make financial sacrifices for the sake of their religious beliefs. 
Third, although many studies have already decomposed the performance of 
conventional funds (Aglietta et al., 2012; Xiong et al., 2010) and socially responsible funds 
(Brière et al., 2017; Henke, 2016), this issue was never addressed in the context of Islamic 
funds. Yet, because of the specific constraints on Islamic fund management, the relative 
importance of the three components of fund performance could be different for Islamic funds 
than for conventional funds. First, because IEF managers operate in a much smaller stock 
universe, the portion of IEF performance explained by market movements should be smaller. 
In fact, the Islamic screening process leads to the exclusion of 65% to 90% of stocks (Peillex 
and Ureche-Rangau, 2013); the leverage ratio screen results in the most exclusions. Therefore, 
IEFs are less diversified (Abu-Alkheil et al., 2017) and more oriented toward “defensive” 
sectors (Desbrières et al., 2017) and have less leveraged firms (Hayat and Hassan, 2017); thus 
they are less exposed to market returns than conventional funds. Second, the distribution 
between the asset allocation policy component (passive management) and the portion under the 
active management tends to be different for Islamic funds. On the one hand, because excessive 
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speculation is prohibited, Islamic fund managers cannot invest in derivatives, short sell, use 
margin trading, or rebalance portfolios very often. Consequently, management of Islamic funds 
can be essentially passive; portfolio managers tend to track the financial performance of sharia-
compliant indices. On the other hand, despite these restrictions, active management remains 
open to Islamic fund managers. Indeed, they can over-invest (under-invest) in specific sharia-
compliant stocks, for instance, by stock picking or using top-down strategies in order to 
outperform their Islamic benchmark index. 
 The goal of our paper is to answer an important question with regard to Islamic mutual 
funds: how much of the variability in returns over time is explained by, respectively, market 
movements, asset allocation policy, and active portfolio management? To do this, we apply the 
model developed by Xiong et al. (2010), decomposing IEF returns into three components: (1) 
market returns, (2) asset allocation policy returns in excess of market returns, and (3) returns 
from active portfolio management. We use a unique database of 281 IEFs for the period 2007-
2016 and assess the contribution of each component in explaining their returns. 
  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review, focusing on Islamic fund performance, and decomposition of fund return variability. 
Section 3 introduces the data and the methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Islamic fund performance 
 
The relative youth of the Islamic investment industry explains some of the difficulty in 
theoretically grounding empirical studies that focus on the performance of this type of 
investment. However, in line with studies that compare socially responsible investment and 
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conventional investment, several theoretical arguments point to underperformance when 
investment is constrained. According to modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), the choice 
of an optimal efficient portfolio is based on maximization of investors’ utility function. 
Investors are concerned exclusively with the "risk-return" behavior of their portfolio, which can 
be optimized through diversification. In this context, the use of negative constraints, or screens, 
shrinks the investment opportunities available and thus reduces the diversification capacity of 
sharia-compliant portfolios. This may produce, ex post, a less optimal efficiency frontier. In the 
same vein, the argument of lower diversification potential for sharia-compliant portfolios may 
also be justified by the prohibition on riba (payment of interest). Indeed, because of this 
principle, Islamic fund managers cannot include conventional money market instruments or 
bonds in their portfolios. Additionally, checking and validating the sharia compliance (or not) 
of the assets by the sharia board generates monitoring costs (Nainggolan et al., 2016). 
Moreover, the exclusion of stocks involved in controversial industries from Islamic funds may 
reduce their relative financial performance. According to a growing literature, “sin” stocks, 
such as alcohol, gambling, and tobacco stocks, outperform industry-comparable stocks (Hong 
and Kacperczyk, 2009). Finally, because this industry is young, Islamic fund managers could 
be less experienced and thus less skilled, resulting in lower financial performance. Previous 
research shows that stock-picking abilities increase with the experience of fund managers 
(Mikhail et al., 1997). 
By contrast, several arguments suggest that the lower degree of diversification displayed 
by sharia-compliant portfolios could be offset by more prudential risk management. First, the 
prohibition on paying interest leads managers to exclude highly leveraged firms from Islamic 
funds, thus helping to mitigate bankruptcy risk. For instance, sharia boards had excluded firms 
such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, or Global Crossing because of their excessive indebtedness, 
even before they experienced scandals. In addition, having less debt may reduce agency costs 
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from conflicts between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Finally, 
regardless of Islamic screens, the outperformance of Islamic portfolios could be the temporary 
result of a mechanical shift in financial flows from stocks that are not sharia compliant to sharia-
compliant stocks. Although the share of Islamic investment in global finance is still limited, 
investors could anticipate an increase in demand for these sharia-compliant securities, at least 
in Muslim countries. This could lower the cost of capital for sharia-compliant companies at 
least in the short term. 
Empirically, studies that have measured the financial performance of Islamic funds are 
quite limited. They are much more likely to analyze the financial performance of Islamic indices 
(e.g., Girard and Hassan, 2008; Jawadi et al., 2014; Naifar, 2016; Walkshäusl and Lobe, 2012). 
However, these studies do not measure the “real” performance of Islamic investment because 
they do not take into account the skills effects of fund managers on the performance of Islamic 
investment. 
Nassir et al. (1997) were among the first to study the financial performance of Islamic 
funds, using a sample of 31 mainly Islamic funds in Malaysia between 1990 and 1995. They 
find that these funds outperform market returns despite the low market-timing ability of their 
managers. However, Islamic fund managers appear to possess superior selection ability in 
picking up well-performing stocks.  
More recently, Hayat and Kraeussl (2011) examined the risk-adjusted returns of 145 
IEFs between 2000 and 2009. Contrary to the findings of Nassir et al. (1997), they show that 
IEFs underperform both their Islamic and conventional equity benchmarks. However, they 
confirm that Islamic fund managers are bad market timers. They explain this result by the 
inexperience of IEF managers due to the young age of this market. The major implication of 
this study is that IEF managers track the performance of their Islamic benchmarks instead of 
implementing active management strategies in order to beat the market. 
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Nainggolan et al. (2016) study this question using a larger sample of IEFs (387 IEFs 
between 1980 and 2010) and comparing them with conventional funds. They find that IEFs 
underperform conventional funds by an average of 40 basis points per month. However, they 
show that IEFs outperformed conventional funds by an average of 50–90 basis points per month 
during the subprime crisis. This result can be explained by the fact that IEF managers exclude 
financial companies and highly leveraged firms, both of which suffered more than other 
companies during the recent financial crisis. 
Finally, Abdelsalam et al. (2014) suggest comparing the performance of 138 Islamic 
funds with that of 636 socially responsible funds over the period 2001-2011. They show that, 
despite important disparities among regions, Islamic funds exhibit lower risk-adjusted returns 
on average. Hence, the literature focusing on Islamic fund performance reveals that Islamic 
investors have to make financial sacrifices on account of their religious beliefs. Interestingly, 
at the same time, many empirical studies find no significant differences in performance between 
Islamic indices and their conventional benchmarks (Girard and Hassan, 2008; Jawadi et al., 
2014; Walkshäusl and Lobe, 2012). Because the difference between IEFs and Islamic indices 
in terms of performance comes from active management, it is interesting to assess the relative 
contribution of active management to IEF return variations.  
 
2.2. Decomposition of fund return variability 
 
 Much of the literature has analyzed the source of variations in fund returns. The first 
studies in this area highlight the crucial role played by asset allocation policy in explaining total 
fund returns (Brinson et al., 1986, 1991). They perform time-series regressions to explain total 
fund returns using combinations of indices that are supposed to reflect returns from the asset 
allocation policy of each fund. They find that asset allocation policy explains approximately 
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90% of the fund return variations. Because market movements are indirectly included in policy 
allocation returns, one of the inherent weaknesses of these studies is that they overestimate the 
contribution of the strategic asset allocation policy (Ibbotson and Kaplan 2000; Vardharaj and 
Fabozzi, 2007). 
 In order to overcome this difficulty, Xiong et al. (2010) propose relativizing the 
contribution of asset allocation policy by rehabilitating the role of market movements and active 
management in the explanation of the total fund returns. They develop a simple methodology 
in which three univariate regressions in time-series make it possible to assess the relative 
portion of fund performance explained by market movements, asset allocation policy, and 
active management, respectively. They apply their model to study the returns of 4,641 US 
equity funds, 587 balanced funds, and 400 international equity funds over the period 1999-
2009. The results show that (1) market movements explain 74-93% of fund return variations; 
(2) asset allocation policy matters for 18-20%; and (3) active management accounts for 10-
26%.  
This method developed by Xiong et al. (2010) is at the root of much empirical research. 
For instance, Aglietta et al. (2012) replicate the work of Xiong et al. (2010) in the context of 
143 US pension funds between 1990 and 2008. They also find that market movements dominate 
the other two components. However, they observe that the results depend significantly on the 
asset class and the method used to measure market movements. In the same vein, Brière et al. 
(2017) decompose the returns of 284 socially responsible funds. Market movements capture 
between 54% and 87% of the return variability of socially responsible funds while conventional 
asset allocation and active management account for 6-18% and 8-17% respectively. Finally, 
Henke (2016) performs his performance-attribution analysis on a sample of 103 socially 
responsible bond funds. Market movements are responsible for 35-46% of performance, asset 
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allocation policy for 11-29%, and active management for 22-31%. Our study aims to extend 
this strand of the literature by decomposing IEF returns.  
  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
 
The initial dataset, from Bloomberg, covers the total monthly returns (net of fees) of 
1,165 active and inactive Islamic mutual funds investing in a variety of asset types and 
geographic areas. We exclude Islamic mutual funds that invest in sukuk (a form of sharia-
compliant bond), commodities, real estate, and Islamic balanced funds because of the absence 
of specific Islamic benchmarks that can be used as proxies for asset allocation policy. We retain 
only IEFs for which: (1) information about the Islamic strategic benchmark is specified; (2) the 
required data to measure the Islamic strategic benchmark returns are available; (3) a track record 
of at least five years exists (Vardharaj and Fabozzi, 2007). The final sample consists of 281 
IEFs from September 2007 to November 2016 that invest in 23 different geographic areas. 
Table 1 lists the number of IEFs by region and the strategic benchmarks that determine 
their asset allocation policies: 38% of IEFs (108) invest in Asia, 31% (86) invest in Middle East 
North Africa (MENA), 20% (57) invest globally, 7% (21) have a preference for the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), 5 invest in the United States, and 4 invest in 
Europe. For each IEF, we attribute an Islamic index, which represents, as precisely as possible, 
the asset allocation policy declared by the fund manager. Except for IEFs investing in Saudi 
Arabia,2 we retained regional Islamic indices provided by the MSCI, which are commonly used 
in the field (e.g., Walkshäusl and Lobe, 2012).  
                                                          
2 As the prices for the MSCI Saudi Arabia Islamic Index are available only since 2009, we chose the S&P Saudi 
Arabia Shariah Index as a strategic benchmark for IEFs investing in Saudi Arabia. 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
According to Aglietta et al. (2012) and Xiong et al. (2010), total returns on a fund can 
be divided into three components: (1) market returns, (2) returns from the asset allocation policy 
in excess of market returns, and (3) returns from active portfolio management: 
)()( itittittit PRMPMR       (1) 
where the dependent variable itR  is the monthly return (net of fees) on an IEF i, tM is the 
market return, and itP  is the return from the Islamic allocation policy on an IEF i. Before 
explaining how we measure the relative contribution of each of the three components, it is 
necessary to explain each notation in greater detail. 
We use two different definitions of market movements. First, following Aglietta et al. 
(2012), Brière et al. (2017), and Xiong et al. (2010), we measure market returns as the equally 
weighted average returns on all the IEFs in our sample. Second, in line with Aglietta et al. 
(2012), Brière et al. (2017), and Henke et al. (2016), we also consider the average return on 
conventional indices. More specifically, we use the average return on six conventional regional 
indices weighted by the number of IEFs per region, i.e., the MSCI World Index (20%), MSCI 
USA Index (2%), MSCI Europe Index (2%), MSCI BRICS Index (7%), MSCI Asia Index 
(38%), and MSCI MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Index (31%). This alternative 
measure of market movements allows us to check the robustness of our results. 
The Islamic allocation policy returns on each IEF are defined by the returns on an 
Islamic index. Based on the geographical focus declared by each IEF, we attribute one Islamic 
benchmark for each IEF. These Islamic benchmarks are presented in Table 1. 
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 To assess the relative contribution of each of the three sources of performance in the 
variability of IEF returns, in line with Aglietta et al. (2012) and Xiong et al. (2010), we perform 
three separate univariate time-series regressions. We run the three separate regressions 
including a constant— itR vs. tM ; itR vs. ( itP - tM ), and itR vs. ( itR - itP )—and we generate R² 
values for each individual component and for each IEF. The returns on each IEF are 
decomposed as follows: 
 itititiStitiPtiMit PRMPMR   )()(    (2) 
where iPiM  , , iS  are the estimated coefficients of each univariate regression, and it  is the 
residual term. 
According to Aglietta et al. (2012) and Xiong et al. (2010), all three R² plus an additional 
balancing term called an “interaction effect” ( 2iR ) equal 100%. In other words, the proportion 
of variance in a fund’s returns can be fully explained by market movements, asset allocation 
policy, active management, and an interaction effect between these factors. For each IEF i we 
thus obtain: 
12222  iiSiPiM RRRR         (3)  
where 22 , iPiM RR , and 
2
iSR  are R² values of the three univariate regressions, and 
2
iR is the 
interaction effect. This last item is the residual of the other three R² values and 100%—the 
percentage of total variance for each IEF that is explained by interaction between market 
movements, asset allocation policy, and active management. 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Main findings 
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 Table 2 lists average R²s for each of the three sources of IEF performance (market 
movements, asset allocation policy, and active management). Panel A shows the results in 
which market returns are measured by the average returns on all IEFs. Panel B is a robustness 
check in which market returns are measured by the average returns on conventional indices 
weighted by the number of IEFs per region. Figure 1 summarizes the portion of conventional 
fund performance (Xiong et al., 2010), socially responsible fund performance (Brière et al., 
2017), and IEF performance that is explained by market movements, asset allocation policy, 
and active management respectively. In all three studies, the funds used are international, and 
the identified market returns are the equally weighted returns of the funds in the sample. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 On average, the market movement portion accounts for about half the IEF return 
variations (49% of the return variations come from the market in Panel A) and dominates the 
contribution of the asset allocation policy and the active management components (28% and 
16% respectively in Panel A). Together, asset allocation policy and active management explain 
on average the other half of IEF returns. The domination of the market movement contribution 
is consistent with the results of Xiong et al. (2010) in the conventional funds context and Brière 
et al. (2017) in the socially responsible funds context. However, this domination is less 
important for IEFs. Indeed, while for IEFs market movements are responsible for 49% in terms 
of R², conventional funds and socially responsible funds account for 74% and 68%, 
respectively. This result can be explained by the specific composition of IEFs, which leads them 
to deviate from market movement returns more than conventional funds. Indeed, because of the 
constraints imposed by sharia scholars, IEFs are less diversified than conventional funds (Abu-
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Alkheil et al., 2017). Additionally, because of the Islamic leverage constraint, IEFs are more 
focused on less leveraged firms (Hayat and Hassan, 2017). Finally, they are characterized by 
higher exposure to “defensive” sectors and by their very low exposure to the financial industry 
(Desbrières et al., 2017). This allows them to under-react to bearish and bullish market 
movements.  
 The results by region show different conclusions depending on the geographical focus. 
Two groups seem to be distinguished: IEFs that invest in the most developed markets (the 
world, the US, and Europe) and IEFs that invest predominantly in emerging countries (BRICS, 
Asia, MENA). In the first group, the market component exceeds 50% in terms of R² (50% for 
the world, 58% for the US, and 59% for Europe). Asset allocation policy is responsible for 
between 12% and 16%, and the active management accounts for more than 21% (21% for the 
world, 37% for the US, and 33% for Europe). We can explain the importance of the market 
component for these “Western IEFs” by their high exposure to domestic stocks (Hoepner et al., 
2011) and its implied level of integration. Specifically, the level of development and integration 
of a stock market affect the risk premium of the assets that make up the funds (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 2000; Levine and Zervos, 1998). These researchers posit that, in very integrated 
markets, the risk premium differences between domestic (defensive) and international 
(offensive) stocks are less important. This implies that, in very integrated markets, domestic 
stocks are more integrated than those in more segmented markets, which explain why, in the 
US, Europe, and world markets, Islamic portfolios are more sensitive to the market component. 
The predominance of active management with regard to asset allocation policy for these 
“Western” IEFs is consistent with Xiong et al. (2010), who find that whereas allocation policy 
accounts for 19% of the returns on conventional funds, active management accounts for 26%. 
This result can be explained by the difficulty, in very integrated markets, of beating the market 
by simply adopting a passive Islamic asset allocation strategy because, as explained above, the 
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universe of sharia-compliant stocks in those developed markets is larger and more integrated. 
The larger the universe, the higher the likelihood of implementing active portfolio strategies by 
picking Islamic stocks. For the second group of IEFs, market movements’ contribution to return 
volatility is smaller (47% in the BRICS, 51% in Asia, and 47% in MENA), and interestingly, 
the average contribution of asset allocation policy is around twice that of active management. 
Indeed, while the asset allocation policy component’s contribution is 30%, 18%, and 49% in 
terms of R² for IEFs that invest in BRICS, Asia, and MENA, respectively, average R² for active 
management is 14%, 8%, and 22%, respectively. Because IEFs that invest in a particular 
country, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, or Thailand, have a smaller investment universe, it is not surprising that 
active management makes a smaller contribution to the second group of IEFs. Indeed, after they 
choose their benchmark, which in their case is quite low, they have very little room for active 
management. 
 Most of the findings appear to be robust to the application of an alternative definition of 
market returns (Panel B). Specifically, except in the MENA region, market movements still 
explain the biggest portion of IEF return volatility. Moreover, because market returns have no 
impact on the active management component (see Equation 2), the R²s for active management 
are identical. For IEFs that invest in the most developed markets, the contribution from the asset 
allocation policy is still smaller than the contribution from active management. However, for 
IEFs that invest in the BRICS, Asia, or MENA, market movements and Islamic allocation 
policy have less importance. The results can be explained by the fact that this measure of market 
returns does not accurately align with the large number of IEFs investing in specific countries, 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, or Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.2. The persistence of results over time 
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 Table 3 presents the results of the decomposition of IEF return variations over three 
subperiods: September 2007-December 2009, January 2010-April 2013, and May 2013-
November 2016. The first subperiod allows us to investigate how the financial crisis affected 
average R²s for each of the three sources of IEF performance. Determining the period of the 
financial crisis is somewhat arbitrary because many events influence this choice. Following 
Chang and Cheng (2016) and Frenkel et al. (2011), we consider that the crisis period starts in 
August 2007 and ends in December 2009. The following two subperiods allow us to provide 
the results before the financial crisis and to test their persistence over time. Three major findings 
emerge. 
 First, during the financial crisis, the market movement component accounts for a larger 
portion of IEF return variations (65% of the return variations comes from the market in Panel 
A and 61% in Panel B). This finding can be explained by the fact that the subprime crisis caused 
a loss of investor confidence that led to a widespread fall in stock prices. Via the contagion 
effect, even non-financial firms suffered during this financial crisis. Hence, firms in which IEFs 
invested certainly followed market movements by also experiencing negative returns. 
 Second, it also seems that the portion attributed to active management matters more 
during the financial crisis than during the period as a whole. Indeed, average R² for active 
management was 19% during subprime crisis. IEF managers could have decided to deviate 
from their Islamic benchmarks in order to slow the decline in their financial performance. 
  Third, the active management component seems to contribute more significantly to the 
explanation of IEF return variations between mid-2013 and 2016. Although average R² for 
active management is 14% and 16% for the period 2010-mid-2013 and the period as a whole 
respectively, in the most recent subperiod it increases to 21%. This result confirms the intuition 
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that IEF managers may have acquired experience and developed skills in managing Islamic 
portfolios, which encourages them to deviate even more from their benchmarks. 
 
4.3. Cross-section analysis 
 
The time-series analysis in particular answers the following question: what is the 
relative contribution of the active management component in explaining IEF return variations 
over time? In order to check the robustness of our results obtained in a time series, we conduct 
a cross-section analysis. The cross-section analysis poses the following question: how much 
does the active management strategy explain the dispersion of IEF returns? To do this, we 
perform a monthly regression of the active management returns of all IEFs on their 
corresponding total returns. Hence, we run 111 cross-section regressions for the 111 months of 
observations as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆( itR − itP ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (4) 
We find that average R² from the 111 cross-section regressions is 31%. Thus, the 
differences in long-term active management strategy between IEFs account for a third of their 
monthly return dispersions. This result must be compared to the R² obtained from time-series 
analysis after neutralizing market movement effects (Xiong et al., 2010). In other words, it 
should be compared with results from the following time-series regression of excess market 
returns: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 −𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆( itR − itP ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.     (5) 
On average, the active management portion accounts for 27% of the IEFs’ excess market 
return variations when the equally weighted average return on all IEFs is used as the market 
return and 31% when the average returns on conventional indices weighted by the number of 
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IEFs per region are used as the market return. As these results are very similar to those on the 
cross-section, we conclude that our time-series findings are robust. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
 In this study, we examined which portion of IEF performance can be explained by 
market movements, asset allocation policy, and active management. Several conclusions 
emerge. First, market movements dominate the other components in explaining nearly 50% of 
the monthly return variability. This domination is smaller for IEFs than for conventional and 
socially responsible funds. This first result shows that IEFs differ from other kinds of funds 
because of the severe limitations on the investment universe because of the specific constraints 
applied. Second, taken together, Islamic asset allocation policy and active management explain 
the other half of IEF returns. The proportions of the contributions of these two sources of 
performance vary significantly according to an IEF’s geographical focus. Although the active 
management portion is larger for funds that invest in the most developed areas, the asset 
allocation policy component explains a larger share of return variations in funds that focus on 
emerging countries. Third, active management explains between 8% and 33% of IEF returns, 
depending on the geographical focus, and it appears to be an important driver of IEF 
performance. This result is surprising since, because of the restriction on speculative trading, 
such as short selling, the management of Islamic funds should be essentially passive. We can 
otherwise explain the disproportionate weight of active management with regard to the under-
diversification risk imposed by Islamic constraints that pushes IEF fund managers to be more 
sensitive to portfolios’ idiosyncratic risks by adopting a more reactive stock-picking approach. 
As many empirical studies find no significant differences in performance between Islamic 
indices and their conventional benchmarks (Jawadi et al., 2014; Walkshäusl and Lobe, 2012), 
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while, at the same time, others show that IEFs underperform their benchmarks, this 
underperformance could come from inefficient active portfolio management.  
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Table 1: Number of IEFs by region and the Islamic benchmarks that determine their asset 
allocation policy 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Geographic focus # IEFs Islamic benchmarks 
   
World 57 MSCI World Islamic Index 
US 5 MSCI USA Islamic Index 
Europe 4 MSCI Europe Islamic Index 
BRICS 3 MSCI BRICS Islamic Index 
China 7 MSCI China Islamic Index 
India 5 MSCI India Islamic Index 
Russia  1 MSCI Russia Islamic Index 
South Africa 5 MSCI South Africa Islamic Index 
Total BRICS 21   
Asia Pacific 9 MSCI Asia Pacific Islamic Index 
Asia Pacific ex Japan 9 MSCI Asia Pacific ex Japan Islamic Index 
Indonesia 22 MSCI Indonesia Islamic Index 
Japan 1 MSCI Japan Islamic Index 
Malaysia 64 MSCI Malaysia Islamic Index 
Thailand 3 MSCI Thailand Islamic Index 
Total Asia 108   
Egypt 1 MSCI Jordan + Egypt + Morocco Islamic Index 
GCC 20 MSCI GCC Countries Islamic Index 
Kuwait 6 MSCI Kuwait Islamic Index 
MENA 16 MSCI MENA Islamic Index 
Morocco  1 MSCI Jordan + Egypt + Morocco Islamic Index 
Pakistan 6 MSCI Pakistan Islamic Index 
Qatar 2 MSCI Qatar Islamic Index 
Saudi Arabia 31 S&P Saudi Arabia Shariah Index 
Turkey 3 MSCI Turkey Islamic Index 
Total MENA 86   
   
ALL 281   
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Table 2: Decomposition of IEFs return variations in terms of average R², September 2007 to 
November 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Average World US Europe BRICS Asia MENA 
        
Panel A 
Market return = equally weighted average return of all the IEFs    
Market 49% 50% 58% 59% 47% 51% 47% 
Asset allocation 28% 16% 12% 14% 30% 18% 49% 
Active management 16% 21% 37% 33% 14% 8% 22% 
Interaction effect 7% 13% -7% -6% 9% 23% -18% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
        
Panel B 
Market return = average return of conventional indices weighted by the number of IEFs per region 
Market 39% 51% 62% 62% 48% 40% 26% 
Asset allocation 16% 16% 16% 19% 12% 6% 30% 
Active management 16% 21% 37% 33% 14% 8% 22% 
Interaction effect 29% 12% -15% -14% 26% 46% 22% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Figure 1: Decomposition of funds returns variations in terms of average R² 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Conventional funds
Xiong et al. (2010)
Socially Responsible Funds
Brière et al. (2017)
Islamic Funds
Market
Asset Allocation
Active Management
Interaction Effect
R² (%)
25 
 
 
Table 3: Decomposition of IEFs return variations in terms of average R² over time 
 2007-2009 2010-mid-2013 Mid-2013-2016 Total period 
     
Panel A 
Market return = equally weighted average return of all the IEFs  
Market 65% 50% 37% 49% 
Asset allocation 23% 25% 23% 28% 
Active management 19% 14% 21% 16% 
Interaction effect -7% 11% 19% 7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
     
Panel B  
Market return = average return of conventional indices weighted by the number of IEFs per region 
Market 61% 38% 23% 39% 
Asset allocation 21% 9% 14% 16% 
Active management 19% 14% 21% 16% 
Interaction effect -1% 39% 42% 29% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
